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Second Circuit Survey

By Jay Curlisle*

During the 2005 survey year, federal courts in the Second Circuit
decided a number of important res judicata matters.' Several district
courts applied the doctrines of claim preclusion2 and issue preclusion3 to
administrative and arbitral determination^.^
Several courts also
expanded the "actually litigated" requirement for collateral estoppel5 and
liberally applied the doctine of defensive claim preclusion for
counterclaim^.^ Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the
*professor of Law, Pace University; Elected Life Fellow of the American Bar Foundation.
1. See infra notes 2, 6, 8, 11, 14, 21, 27, 30, 34, 37, 39, 41, 44, 47, 48, 50, 52, 58 and
accompanying text.
2. Claim preclusion is sometimes referred to as res judicata. Claim preclusion has
been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as follows: after a
final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, res judicata
"precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in that action." Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d
Cir. 2005); see also St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2000); see generally 18
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 131.10(l)(a) (3d ed.
2005).
3. Issue preclusion is sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel. The Second Circuit
defined issue preclusion in Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1999).
If subsequent litigation arises from a different cause of action, the prior judgment bars only
those matters or issues common to both actions that were expressly or by necessary
implication adjudicated in the prior litigation. This prong of res judicata is referred to as issue
preclusion. The United States Supreme Court stated that issue preclusion means when an
issue has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Id. (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222,
232 (1994)).
4. See infra notes 44,47,48,50, 52,58,60 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 2 1,27 and accompanying text.
6. See Neshewat v. Salem, 305 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In
Neshewat, Judge William C. Comer held that the defendant's counterclaim was barred by
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Second Circuit issued seven res judicata decisions.' In one, Vargas v.
City of New yorkY8the Second Circuit refined the standards for applying
the Rooker-Feldman d ~ c t r i n e .This
~ survey article will review some of
the Second Circuit's significant res judicata decisions and will critique
those giving preclusive effect to administrative and arbitral
determinations.

The term res judicata has been used by the Second Circuit in
reference to a variety of concepts focusing on the preclusive effects of a
judgment on subsequent litigation. Claim preclusion occurs pursuant to
"merger" and "bar" principles'0 and operates to preclude all other claims
claim preclusion. Defendant previously brought an action against the plaintiff wherein he
asked the court to overturn a state court default judgment entered against him. That was
exactly the relief defendant sought to assert in his counterclaim based on the same set of facts.
Judge Conner stated:
Changing the legal theory upon which the request for relief is based does not bar
the applicability of res judicata. Furthermore, the previous action involved an
adjudication on the merits, involved both parties involved in the present action, and
the claims asserted in this action were or could have been asserted in the prior
action.
Id.
7. See infra notes 21; 27, 30, 34,37,39,41 and accompanying text.
8. 377 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2004).
9. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court cases,
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldrnan,
460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that lower federal courts "lack
subject matter jurisdiction 'over cases that effectively seek review ofjudgments of state courts
and that federal review, if any, can occur only by way of certiorari petition to the Supreme
Court."' Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Moccio v. N.Y.
State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1996)). In Rooker, the Supreme
Court held that "no federal court, other than the Supreme Court, can consider a claim to
reverse or modify a state court judgment." Phifer, 289 F.3d ai 55 (citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at
416). In Feldman, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the principal and held that if
plaintiffs claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court's determination, the district
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain those claims. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16.
10. See OSCAR G . CHASE & ROBERT A. BARKER, CIVIL LITIGATION IN NEW
YORK 4 23.01, at 927 (4th ed. 2002) ("Claim preclusion, which includes the doctrines of
'merger' and 'bar' is operative 'when a judgment is rendered in an action and a second action
is sought to be maintained on the same claim. Ordinarily, if the judgment was rendered for
the plaintiff, the claim is held to be extinguished and merged in the judgment; if the judgment
was rendered for the defendant . . . the judgment is a bar to a second action on the same
claim."').
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arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions, even if based
upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy."
Issue
preclusion precludes a . party or his privy from relitigating in a
subsequent action an issue that was actually litigated and necessary to
judgment in the prior action.12 It occurs when one party to a civil action
argues that preclusive effect should be given to one or more issues
determined in an earlier civil action, administrative proceeding, or
arbitration between the same parties in the same jurisdiction. The
United States Supreme Court explained the difference between claim
preclusion and issue preclusion in Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore:
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars
a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same
cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand,
the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the
prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the
13
outcome of the first action.

Application of claim and issue preclusion requires a valid, final
judgment on the merits. A valid judgment is one issued by a court with
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. A final judgment usually does
not contemplate the full completion of the appellate process.'4
Moreover, the term "on the merits" includes dismissals on statute of
limitations grounds'5 and default judgments.I6 Because there are few
statutory justifications for applications of claim and issue preclusion,
public policy justifications are determinative and underlie each of the
Circuit's res judicata 2005 decisions. Such public policy justifications
for claim and issue preclusion include society's desires to promote
fairness," prevent inconsistent judgments, achieve uniformity and

1 1. Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2005).
12. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,327 n.5 (1979).
13. Id.
14. But see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Bickel, 123 F. App'x 416, 417 (2d Cir. 2005)
(explaining that, in some jurisdictions (Illinois), a judgment is not final for claim preclusive
effect until the time for appeal has expired or until appeals have been exhausted).
15. See CHASE & BARKER, supra note 10, at 940-41 (citing Smith v. Russell Sage
College, 429 N.E.2d 746 (N.Y. 1981)).
16. Reich v. Cochran, 45 N.E. 367 (N.Y. 1896). See generally DAVID D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE 726 (3d student ed. 1999).
17. Concepts of fair play and due process have consistently been important policy
considerations for district courts in the Second Circuit and for the circuit court when
considering whether to apply claim and issue preclusion. S.E.C. v. Monarch Funding Corp.,
192 F.3d 295,303-04 (2d Cir. 1999).
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certainty,'* finalize disputes among the parties,'g and conserve judicial
reso~rces.~~

In Vargas v. City of New ~ork," a former New York City police
officer was tried on departmental charges of using excessive force in
effectuating an arrest. After charges were sustained, Vargas was
dismissed from the NYPD and sought review in a state court pursuant to
Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and ~ u l e s . ' ~The state
court concluded the charges were supported by substantial e~idence.'~
Vargas then sued in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983, alleging his dismissal
violated equal protection and due process. The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. This doctrine provides that inferior federal courts have no
subject matter jurisdiction over some cases that seek review of state
court judgments. The Second Circuit applies the doctrine to claims and
issues that would be barred under principles of preclusion.24
In Vargas, the circuit court stated: "Under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, inferior courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over suits
that seek direct review of judgments of state courts, or that seek to
resolve issues that are 'inextricably intertwined' with earlier state court
determination^."^^ The circuit court pointed out that the U.S. Supreme
Court provides few standards or guidance for determining when claims
are inextricably intertwined with prior state court judgments, but noted,
at a minimum, that it was necessary that a federal plaintiff had an
opportunity to litigate the claim in the state proceeding. Because Vargas
could not have brought his 9 1983 claim in a state Article 78 proceeding,
the circuit court stated that "only issue preclusion triggers the Rooker-

18. See Id. See also Brainerd Cunie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281,289 (1957).
19. See Monarch, 192 F.3d at 303-04.
20. See Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420,424-25 (2d Cir. 1999).
2 1. 377 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2004).
22. See Vargas v. Safir, 7 17 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 2000).
23. Id. at 563.
24. Vargas, 377 F.3d at 203.
25. Id. at 205.
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Feldman bar."26 The court then explained that, under New York law,
issue preclusion will be applied if there is identity of issue (the issue in
question was actually litigated and necessary to the judgment in the prior
action) and if the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. The Second
Circuit held that the issue in Vargas's federal action, alleging individual
and department-wide racial discrimination, was not actually and
necessarily decided in the state proceeding. Thus, the court reversed the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claims and stated:
While it is true that the Article 78 court passed upon the propriety of Vargas's
termination, this acknowledgement does not demonstrate that the court
'actually and necessarily' decided an issue that was never presented to it, even
27
if that issue touched, in a general sense, on the propriety o f the termination.

In another Second Circuit case, Grant v. City of New ~ a v e n , the
*~
plaintiff brought a pro se action against the City of New Haven. Grant
had previously sued the city in Connecticut Superior Court. The state
court held against Grant. The United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut dismissed the action on grounds of res judicata
and pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision and stated: "Grant cannot seek
reversal of the state court judgment simply by recasting his complaint in
the form of a civil rights complaint."29 The circuit court's dismissal was
final and the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to amend his
complaint because the circuit believed it was "unlikely" that an amended
complaint would succeed.30 The Second Circuit's decision is
questionable because, generally, pro se plaintiffs are given at least one
opportunity to amend a complaint subject to di~missal.~'
Conversely, in Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A.?~
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a retaliatory
discharge claim on the grounds that it was not barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion. In 1995, Legnani filed a Title VII action against the

26. Id.
27. Id. at 206.
28. 1 15 F. App'x 475 (2d Cir. 2004).
29. Id. at 476.
30. Id.
31. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 5.7, at 267-68,
5.15, at 293-94 (4th ed. 2005). See also Dioguardi v. Duming, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
32. 400 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2005).
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defendant and in 1998, while the 1995 action was pending, the defendant
fired Legnani. The plaintiff sought leave to amend her 1995 complaint
to add a retaliatory discharge claim based on this event, but the district
court denied the request. Legnani did not appeal the ruling, and the
court awarded judgment for the defendant on the 1995 claim.
Legnani then brought the retaliatory discharge claim in a complaint
filed in 1999. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred,
but the Second Circuit reversed.33 On remand, the defendant moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Legnani's discharge claim was barred
by the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court dismissed the
action. The circuit court first noted, "[wle review de novo the district
court's application of the principles of res j ~ d i c a t a , "and
~ ~ then held the
plaintiffs retaliatory discharge action was not barred by claim
preclusion because it occurred after the commencement of the prior
action. The court stated, "'[c]laims arising subsequent to a prior action
need not, and often perhaps could not, have been brought in that prior
action; accordingly, they are not barred by res judicata regardless of
whether they are premised on facts representing a continuance of the
same course of conduct."' The circuit court pointed out that when a
plaintiffs motion to amend a complaint is denied, and the claim is
brought later as a separate lawsuit, the decision denying leave to amend
is irrelevant to the claim preclusion analysis.35
In three other summary order cases, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's use of claim preclusion to bar plaintiffs actions. In
Bettis v. ell^,^^ a wrongful termination claim by a former police
department employee against city and police commissioners was brought
subsequent to a prior federal claim that was dismissed on summary
judgment.37 In the second action, Bettis contended that his claims were
based on different legal theories and that the appellees had
inappropriately withheld information during the prior litigation.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit stated, "res judicata bars relitigation of
issues that 'could have been raised' in a prior action. Similarly, any
allegations of misconduct in the prior litigation should have been raised
33. See Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 685-87 (2d. Cir.
2001). In 1995, Legnani filed an action under Title VII and the New York City Human Rights
Law against her employer, defendant appellee. The action was dismissed as time-barred
under 42 U.S.C. 9 2000e-5(e)(l). The Second Circuit reversed and remanded.
34. Legnani,400 F.3d at 141.
35. Id. at 141-42.
36. 137 F. App'x 381 (2d Cir. 2005).
37. See Bettis v. Safir, No. 97-CV-1908,2000 WL 1336055 (S.D.N.Y.Sept. 15,2000).
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in an appropriate challenge to that judgment."38 Similarly, in Moss v. E.
on A G , the
~ ~ Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
plaintiffs claims on res judicata (claim preclusion) grounds. The court
stated, "Moss raised his present claims in prior proceedings. The fact
that he titles his complaint differently in this case does not allow him to
avoid the preclusive effect of res j~dicata."~' Also, in Virgo v. U. S.
Customs ~ e r v i c e , ~the
' Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of plaintiffs actions on res judicata grounds. The court stated:
We acknowledge that Virgo changed his legal argument between the 2001 suit
and the 2004 motion-in
the former, Virgo claimed that he had received
inadequate notice of seizure; in the latter, he argued that the seizure was
invalid on criminal procedure grounds. But it is clear that Virgo's 2004 claims
for the same funds from the same federal agency were or could have been
raised in the complaint he filed in 2 0 0 1 . ~ ~

In Doctor S Associates, Inc. v. ~ i c k e lthe
,~~
Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision not to give a prior judgment issue preclusion
effect.44 The circuit court based its decision on a determination that,
under Illinois law, a judgment is not final until the time for appeal has
expired or until appeals have been exhausted. This decision reminds the
bench and bar that, under Erie principles, the law of the forum where the
first judgment was granted should be used to determine if issue
preclusion is applicable. Under New York state law, a judgment is final
when entered, but Illinois case law applies different standards for
deciding when a judgment is final for res judicata purposes.45

38. Bettis, 137 F. App'x at 382 (citations omitted). See generally FED. R. ClV. P.
60(b) (the court may "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding" resulting from "fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party . . . .").
39. 118 F. App'x 553 (2d. Cir. 2004).
40. Id. at 554.
41. 123 F. App'x 418 (2d Cir. 2005).
42. Id. at 420 (internal quotations omitted).
43. 123 F. App'x 416 (2d Cir. 2005).
44. Id. Appellants appealed from a decision of the district court confirming an
arbitration award that resolved their dispute with the appellee. On appeal, appellants argued
that the arbitrator failed to afford res judicata effect to a prior default judgment obtained by
the appellants and to a prior judgment obtained by their landlord. The Second Circuit rejected
these arguments.
45. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995), wherein the Second
Circuit concluded that a default judgment could not be given res judicata effect because it
would not be considered final under Illinois law.
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A. Administrative Determinations

There are five significant district court decisions that apply the
doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion to administrative
determinations. These decisions indicate that some of the Second
Circuit's trial judges may be inclined to conserve judicial resources and
reduce burdensome caseloads by relaxing their demands on traditional
requirements of fairness and due process.
In Light Sources, Inc. v. Cosmedico Light, lnc.,46 an administrative
determination by the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board ("TTAB") was
given claim preclusion effect by the district court.47 The court pointed
out, "[glenerally, administrative proceedings may have res judicata
effect if they are adjudicative in nature."48 The court noted that the
TTAB acted in a judicial capacity because it was an adversarial
proceeding. Thus a fraud claim, which could have been brought in the
administrative hearings, was barred. However, in Stepheny v. BrookIyn
Hebrew School for Special ~ h i l d r e n ;the
~ district court refused to apply
issue preclusion to a prior administrative determination because the
administrative law judge did not consider the issues brought before the
federal court. Judge Glasser held that the administrative law judge had
considered only the limited issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to
unemployment law benefits based upon her alleged misconduct in
connection with her employer.
The employer had not sent a
representative or submitted any evidence to the administrative tribunal,
which supported its position in the federal lawsuit.

46. 360 F. Supp. 2d 432 (D. Conn. 2005).
47. The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board was acting as an administrative agency.
Id. at 438.
48. Id. See also, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966)
("When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues
of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the
courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." (citations omitted)).
49. 356 F. Supp. 2d 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Former employees of a private school
brought an action under Title VII, the New York City Human Rights law, and the New York
State Human Rights Law alleging a racially hostile work environment, race discrimination,
and retaliation. The School moved for summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds,
arguing that the issue determinations of a state administrative law judge should be given
preclusive effect.).
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In Greenberg v. New York City Transit ~uthority," the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York held that findings of the New
York State Workman's Compensation Board ("WCB") had preclusive
effect in New York courts under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The
court explained the critical questions of determining whether the WCB
findings had preclusive effect were whether there was an identity of
issue and whether the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to contest
the decision. The court reasoned that the burden of proving identity of
the issue rested on the party invoking issue preclusion, while his
opponent had the burden of proving that he did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue. The court found that the plaintiff
satisfied the burden of showing identity of issue that had been
necessarily decided in the prior administrative action and was decisive of
the federal action. The full and fair opportunity requirement was not
raised or briefed by the defendants and was therefore ~ a i v e d . ~Under
'
the circumstances, the district court should have conducted its own
inquiry into whether the defendant had an opportunity to litigate the
issue of whether he unlawfilly discriminated against the plaintiff based
on a disability within the definitions of WCB regulations.
Similarly, in Barna v. ~ o r ~ athe
n district
, ~ ~ court concluded that a
New York state agency's finding of no probable cause was res judicata
as to the plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. 4 1981. The plaintiff argued
that he was not given an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue of
probable cause because he did not appear before the agency.
Nonetheless, the district court defined the full and fair opportunity
aspect of issue preclusion in terms of a party's failure to take advantage
of an opportunity to litigate. Because Barna was notified of the need to
respond to the agency's charges in a timely manner and failed to do so,
he waived the opportunity, and issue preclusion could be asserted
against him.53
50. 336 F. Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
5 1. Id. at 250 ("Thus, plaintiff satisfies the burden of showing that defendant unlawfully
discriminated against him based on a disability within the meaning of both NYSHRL and
NYCHRL. Summary judgment in plaintiff's favor on these claims should be granted.").
52. 341 F. Supp. 2d 164 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New
York State Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. He was notified by the Department of a probable cause hearing and warned that
if he failed to respond, a determination would be made on the record. The plaintiff failed to
respond and then filed his federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.).
53. Id. at 167. The district court stated that a state agency's resolution of factual issues
adverse to the complainant will bar a federal civil rights action "if (I) the state agency was
acting in a judicial capacity; (2) the disputed issues of fact were properly before the agency
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In Levich v. Liberty Central School ~ i s t r i c t ,administrative
~~
determinations were given issue preclusion effect to preclude the
plaintiff from litigating his First Amendment claims in federal court.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York recognized that
the plaintiff did not choose to bring his First Amendment claim in the
administrative forum, but, because he faced the possibility of losing his
job, he had a strong incentive to litigate the issue as thoroughly as
possible. The district court then found that the administrative hearing
officer conducted the same balancing test that would be applied to
plaintiffs claims in a 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 action in federal court. The
court stated: "Simply because plaintiff is unhappy with the hearing
officer's evidentiary ruling does not mean that plaintiff did not have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and does not entitle him to a
second chance for a more favorable outcome in another forum."55 The
court's reliance on People v. ~
l is misplaced
e
~ here ~because,
~ in that
case, the highest court of New York State made it clear that the full and
fair opportunity requirement is more than traditional notions of due
process.57 As a matter of first impression, the Levich court also dealt
with whether federal district courts adjudicating 5 1983 actions should
apply issue preclusion to unreviewed legal determinations by state
administrative bodies. The district court reviewed two leading decisions
from other
and declined to extend preclusive effect to
unreviewed agency determinations of law.59
and the parties were given an adequate opportunity to litigate them; and (3) the courts of the
particular state would give the agency's fact-finding determinations preclusive effect." Id. at
168. Plaintiff agreed that the first and third requirements were met, but argued that he was not
given an adequate opportunity to litigate. The district court held this requirement was
satisfied because the plaintiff was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard. The court
stated: "Barna's failure to take advantage of the opportunity does not demonstrate a
deprivation of it." Id.
54. 361F.Supp.2dI5I(S.D.N.Y.2004).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 158.
57. See417 N.E.2d 518 (N.Y. 1980).
58. Levich, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 160-61. See also Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 634
n.2 (9th Cir. 1988), and Edmundson v. Borough of Kennet Square, 4 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir.
1993).
59. Levich, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 160. The district court relied on Univ. of Tern. v. Elliot,
478 U.S. 788 (1986), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court discussed whether issue preclusion is
applicable to unreviewed state agency determinations. In Edmundson, the Third Circuit held
that unreviewed determinations of law could not be given preclusive effect under Elliot
because of the Supreme Court's very specific use of the word "factfinding" throughout the
opinion. Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 192. The district court relied on Edmundson's interpretation
of the law.
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B. Arbitral Determinations
In In re el,^^ the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York held that a prior arbitration proceeding precluded a debtor from
relitigating issues of the debtor's fraud. The arbitration panel had issued
an award against the debtor and in favor of the appellees. The debtor
never appealed the award, and a bankruptcy court granted appellees'
motion for summary judgment and stated that the debtor was collaterally
estopped from relitigating issues previously determined after years of
litigation in the arbitration proceeding. On appeal, the district court
noted it must refer to the applicable state law where the arbitration was
held. Thus, Florida law governed the applicability of issue preclusion.
The debtor argued he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue at the arbitration hearing because the panel precluded him from
testifying or offering evidence on his own behalf at the hearing. The
district court reasoned that because the debtor failed to respond to prior
orders from the arbitration panel he had been given a full opportunity to
defend himself and the "actually litigated" requirement under Florida
law was ~atisfied.~'The court stated, "In the instant case, the Court
finds that the actually litigated element is met, because Debtor had the
full opportunity to defend himself at the Arbitration Proceeding and
voluntarily chose not to comply with several orders."62
In Dujardin v. Liberty Media C ~ r p . the
, ~ district
~
court noted that
"[ilt is well settled that collateral estoppel or issue preclusion applies to
issues resolved by a prior arbitrati~n."~~
The court refused to apply the
doctrine because Dujardin failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that
the damages issue decided by the arbitrator was identical to the issue
presented before the district court.65 Thus, the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment was denied to the extent it sought a determination as
to damages based on the collateral estoppel effect of the arbitrator's
ruling.66

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

315 B.R. 645 (E.D.N.Y.2004).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
359 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y.2005).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 359.
Id.
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C. Administrative and Arbitral Unfairness

When federal courts give preclusive effect to decisions by
administrative and arbitral bodies, they assume fairness and the
opportunity to litigate can be satisfied without pre-trial discovery, formal
application of the rules of evidence, or fact-finding juries. This raises
the question of whether litigants should be deprived of rights guaranteed
to them by federal courts.
There are many advantages to extensive discovery in federal courts:
it assures fairness to the litigants, prevents surprises, encourages
settlements, and improves the efficiency of a trial or hearing and the
quality of the decisions made.
Administrative and arbitral
determinations are usually made without dis~overy.~'This means that
litigants are not given access to relevant and nonprivileged information
that is in the custody of their adversaries. They are unable to formulate
issues as they would in a court of law and cannot fully present
constitutional claims. Also, administrative and arbitral forums are not
bound by the rules of evidence. This means determinations can be made
based on hearsay, testimony that would be prohibited in courts of law,
and pursuant to inferences not permitted in courts of law. The plaintiffs
burden of proof and the preponderance of evidence standards in arbitral
and administrative forums differ from those in federal courts. Justice
and fairness in judicial forums are viewed in terms of formal rituals
supervised by an impartial and independent judiciary. Rules of
evidence, procedure, and case law govern the development and
application of these rituals. Justice and fairness in administrative and
arbitral forums focus, primarily, on giving citizens access to simplified
dispute resolution systems that do not feature the procedural protections
provided in federal courts. In addition, many administrative and arbitral
hearing officers are employed by the same agencies that establish the
regulations the officials are applying. Based on these concerns,
application of res judicata principles to administrative and arbitral
determinations should be limited.

67. Jay C . Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine oflssue
Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding a Court of Law, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 63,84-88 (1986).
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RES JUDICATA

IV. CONCLUSION
Published 2005 Second Circuit res judicata decisions demonstrate
that courts in the Second Circuit have immense respect for the doctrine
of res judicata. As demonstrated above, courts within the Second Circuit
rely on the doctrine to achieve finality, to prevent inconsistent
judgments, and to allocate judicial resources.
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